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Abstract: There are empirical 
grounds to doubt the effectiveness of 
a common and intuitive approach to 
teaching debiasing strategies in 
critical thinking courses. We 
summarize some of the grounds 
before suggesting a broader 
taxonomy of debiasing strategies. 
This four-level taxonomy enables a 
useful diagnosis of biasing factors 
and situations, and illuminates more 
strategies for more effective bias 
mitigation located in the shaping of 
situational factors and reasoning 
infrastructure—sometimes called 
“nudges” in the literature. The 
question, we contend, then becomes 
how best to teach the construction 
and use of such infrastructures. 
	  
	  
 
 
Résumé: Des données empiriques 
nous permettent de douter de 
l'efficacité d'une approche commune 
et intuitive pour enseigner des 
stratégies de correction de biais 
cognitifs dans les cours de pensée 
critique. Nous résumons certains de 
ces résultats empiriques avant de 
suggérer une taxonomie plus 
étendue de ces stratégies de 
correction de biais. Cette taxonomie 
à quatre niveaux permet un 
diagnostic utile de facteurs causant 
les biais et elle met en évidence 
davantage de stratégies permettant la 
correction plus efficace de biais, 
stratégies situées dans des mesures 
modifiant les infrastructures et les 
environnements cognitifs ("nudge" 
dans la littérature). Nous soutenons 
que la question porte dès lors sur les 
meilleures façons d'enseigner la 
construction et l'utilisation de ces 
infrastructures.
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1. Introduction 
 
Teaching critical thinking is an undertaking that permits 
emphasis on many different combinations of elements, the most 
traditional of which are formal logic, informal logic, 
argumentation, fallacy theory, and rhetoric. Increasingly, too, 
critical thinking courses and texts include an explicit emphasis 
on the psychology of cognitive and social biases (see, for 
example, Kenyon 2008; Ruggiero 2004; Groarke & Tindale 
2004; and Gilovich 1991). While they vary greatly in the length 
and detail of their treatments, a common feature of these texts is 
that they present names, taxonomies and definitions of some key 
biases, perhaps with some examples or explanations of the 
underlying empirical work included. Given their role in critical 
thinking didactics, it is safe to assume that these treatments are 
intended to foster practical reasoning skills of mitigating or 
forestalling the effects of biases – to enable students to identify 
biases in reasoning, and to minimize biases in their own 
thinking. 
The overall aim is consonant with the general rationale for 
teaching critical reasoning courses in the first place. Yet these 
texts also commonly lack empirically-informed material, 
distinct from that already mentioned, that aims to teach students 
the skills of minimizing bias in their thinking or their actions. In 
other words, the combination of what such treatments do and do 
not contain reflects the assumption that simply teaching students 
about biases is an effective way of enabling them to reduce the 
distortions of biases in their own thinking. We identify this 
assumption as the intuitive approach to teaching debiasing, or 
IA. 
 
(IA) Teaching facts about biases, including a taxonomy 
of biases and their various propensities to distort 
reasoning, is a reasonably effective means of providing 
students in critical reasoning courses with skills enabling 
the detection and mitigation of biases, including students’ 
own biases. 
 
Something along the lines of IA informs the treatments that 
biases receive in the critical thinking texts already noted. It is 
also central to some reviews on the topic (e.g., Larrick 2004), 
while its influence can be seen also in training contexts beyond 
that of a critical thinking course. An example of this latter type 
of context is Croskerry, Singhal, & Mamede’s (2013a, 2013b) 
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approach to cognitive debiasing for clinicians’ medical 
judgments: even though Croskerry et al. record a “general 
pessimism […] about the feasibility of cognitive debiasing” 
(Croskerry et al. 2013a, p. ii63), they adopt the recommendation 
that clinicians “must be informed and recognise the need for 
constant vigilance and surveillance of their [own] thinking to 
mitigate diagnostic and other clinical errors” (Croskerry et al. 
2013b, p. 6).1  
It is noteworthy that IA characterizes much of how critical 
thinking education treats debiasing, we contend, because when 
one considers the empirical evidence bearing on it, the most 
plausible simple view of IA is that it is—at least in most cases—
false.2 At least, the practice of simply teaching students facts 
about biases is not as effective as one might hope. The literature 
on the cognitive and social psychology of debiasing indicates, 
on balance, that teaching people about biases does not reliably 
debias them. Indeed, the literature suggests that (for at least a 
wide class of biases) practically any debiasing strategy intended 
to be learned and subsequently self-deployed by individuals, 
acting alone and at the point of making a judgment, is unlikely 
to succeed in significantly minimizing biases. 
In the following remarks, we briefly outline why this is 
so before moving on to consider the ramifications for critical 
thinking education. Vast resources are currently devoted to 
teaching critical reasoning worldwide. Does the implausibility 
of IA mean that these resources are misused, to the extent that 
they are predicated on IA? Should philosophers, psychologists, 
and other critical reasoning educators just stop including a focus 
on biases in critical thinking education?  
We do not think so. Rather, we take the lesson to be that 
whole societies and polities have a major interest in promoting 
efficacious debiasing education—extending to population-level 
demographic scales and intergenerational time scales. The 
difficulty of teaching debiasing skills that could be deployed in a 
strictly atomistic or individualistic way counts in favor of 
teaching and investing also in more collective debiasing 
strategies and infrastructure that would serve the latter sorts of 
interests. This approach will encompass teaching not just 
individual skills and knowledge, but skills that enable the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In fact the distinctions between approaches to critical thinking that we 
propose in the following remarks should be helpful in characterizing the 
kinds of clinical training strategies described by Croskerry et al. (2013a, 
2013b). 
2 Below, we identify some methods that would fall under IA that we believe 
to be relatively promising. 
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construction of reasoning infrastructure, and effective 
participation in social and organizational reasoning processes 
and decision procedures. 
What would these processes, strategies and infrastructure 
look like? A key first step here is to reflect on the breadth of 
what can count as debiasing from a critical thinking perspective. 
Our aim in this reflection is to help motivate and set the stage 
for creative and empirically guided work on how to teach 
debiasing in ways that might be efficacious, serving both private 
and public interests in minimizing distorted or unreliable 
reasoning. By focusing on choices, behavior, and agent-world 
interactions, we suggest a broader range of outcomes for critical 
thinking than that informing IA, and therefore a broader range 
of options for critical thinking education as well. 
Those familiar with the critical thinking literature can 
skip section 2, in which we develop and justify our 
characterization of IA. In section 3, we present some reasons for 
pessimism towards IA. Finally, in sections 4 and 5, we introduce 
our positive proposal by first distinguishing different ways in 
which we can debias and then discussing how this impacts the 
way we conceive critical thinking education. 
 
 
2. Characterizing the intuitive approach 
 
First, an explanation and a caveat. By ‘bias’ we most generally 
mean something neutral with respect to both moral properties 
and questions of accuracy. A bias in this sense is simply a 
disposition, implicit or explicit, to reach a particular kind of 
conclusion or outcome, or to remain in one. This interpretation, 
common in the psychological literature, accommodates the idea 
that biases can skew a process in a way that makes its outcome 
inaccurate or otherwise wrong, but it also leaves open the 
prospect that biases play a role in truth-conducive reasoning 
processes and morally unproblematic judgments or attitudes. In 
common parlance, of course, one normally goes to the trouble of 
saying that some attitude, reasoning, or person is biased only if 
the operation of the bias is claimed to be problematic—a 
distortion, or a prejudice that amounts to a vice. Our focus on 
debiasing is one that presumes the former meaning: it is 
predicated on the thought that biases should be mitigated when 
they are problematic, and not because they are by definition 
problematic (e.g., Klein & Kahneman 2009 explore when and 
how heuristics and their associated biases can help us get things 
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right). Not everything that is a bias needs to be debiased; only 
biases manifesting in a problematic manner or degree. 
The caveat is that the empirical literature on biases and on 
debiasing is massive and varied; even to summarize it 
comprehensively would be impossible for a single paper. The 
number of biases to consider is moreover increasing as 
psychologists discover or propose new ones.3 We will use just a 
few results we believe to be representative to illustrate the 
grounds for thinking that teaching students about biases, and 
warning them to be on the lookout for biases, is unlikely to 
significantly reduce the generation of distorted judgments “in 
the wild,” or to increase the likelihood that biased judgments 
will be recognized and remedied by the agent herself. Because 
we hope to spend some time on the implications of this fact for 
critical thinking education, we are compelled to move through 
the empirical evidence rather briskly. So our subsequent 
reflections will have to remain conditional, not just on the 
probity of the defeasible empirical literature, but on the accuracy 
of our depiction of that literature.4 
The most general problem to emphasize about IA is 
illustrated in Baruch Fischhoff’s (1982) influential work on 
mitigating the hindsight bias. Hindsight bias is the tendency to 
regard actual outcomes as inevitable outcomes, in retrospect, 
and to overestimate the extent to which one had antecedently 
expected the actual outcome. Fischhoff points out that a number 
of approaches to debiasing subjects for hindsight effects simply 
do not work very well under a wide range of experimental 
conditions (1982, pp. 427-431). These approaches, falling under 
IA, include: 
• Explicitly explaining the bias to subjects, and asking 
them to avoid it in their own reasoning; 
• Inducing subjects to value the accuracy of their 
performance; 
• Encouraging subjects to think first in terms of 
diagnosing other subjects’ biased reasoning, before 
turning to the question of their own reasoning. 
These strategies (and others that Fischhoff describes) are 
motivated by some quite natural assumptions about the nature of 
learning, of cognition, and of error—the most basic one being 
the idea behind IA, that forewarned is forearmed. But the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Stanovich reviews this expanding literature and offers a useful taxonomy 
with relatively few categories (2009, p. 182; 2011, p. 230-243). 
4 A somewhat more detailed examination of this evidence is provided in 
Kenyon (2014). 
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ineffectiveness of these strategies at mitigating hindsight bias, 
and many other biases, has been quite strongly confirmed by 
subsequent psychological work (Wilson et al. 2002).  
 
 
3.	  Pessimism about teaching debiasing abilities 
 
Fischhoff’s studies and subsequent ones are, perforce, largely 
experimental designs that isolate specific instances of biased 
reasoning, rather than longitudinal analyses of learning 
outcomes in educational contexts. The latter type of study, 
though, tends to be hard to perform rigorously, and hard to 
interpret (Willingham 2007, p. 12). Experimental designs 
constitute the best evidence we now possess about the 
propensity for normally teachable information and skills to 
reduce biased reasoning in students, outside the classroom and 
in later life. How much confidence to place in the applicability 
of these results is a good question; but this is the evidence we 
have. On balance, it weighs against the thought that simply 
teaching and warning people about biases will successfully 
mitigate biased reasoning. IA is not well supported by evidence. 
Perhaps the most significant factor explaining why 
teaching people about biases does not itself particularly reduce 
their biases is known in the literature as bias blind spot (Pronin 
and Kugler 2007; Pronin, Lin & Ross 2002).5  Put simply: 
knowing that people in general are subject to a particular bias is 
consistent with one’s believing that one is not subject to it. 
Indeed, more importantly, even knowing that one is generally 
susceptible to a bias is consistent with one’s believing, on the 
specific occasion one considers the matter, that one is not 
displaying a bias. Bias blind spot thereby insulates one’s 
judgments, in the event, from the application of whatever 
debiasing strategies might actually be effective. 
A related explanation for the relative ineffectiveness of 
teaching information about biases is that we can easily think that 
we have debiased when we have not. A theoretical knowledge 
of the need to adjust for bias does not reduce this problem, since 
the problem is precisely that one falsely believes oneself to have 
addressed that need. Indeed, merely thinking about debiasing 
can enable the problem! By thinking over the details of the case 
at hand, and considering the prospect of being biased, one may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We would encourage the use of another expression that could communicate 
this idea just as well, without using the ableist expression blindness to denote 
a type of ignorance (cf. Schorr 1999). 
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simply give one’s biases more raw material to operate on 
(Thompson 1995). Here, then, another appealing thought about 
clear thinking meets unwelcome data: the idea that one can 
debias by firmly thinking it over, that debiasing can be a matter 
of having a stern word with oneself about not being biased, is 
mistaken (Frantz & Janoff-Bulman 2000). In fact, attempting to 
self-debias in this way can even make one’s biases worse (Hirt 
and Markman 1995; Sanna, Stocker & Schwartz 2002). Telling 
ourselves that we have debiased, we can come to hold our 
attitudes and views more strongly—convinced that they have 
been vetted for distortion. As Frantz (2006, p. 165) observed, 
merely to ask a question like “Am I being fair?” is to provide an 
additional opportunity for a bias to operate, accompanied by a 
greater conviction that one’s judgment is unbiased. 
This conveys a sense of the kinds of evidence speaking 
against the idea that we can teach people to be significantly less 
biased reasoners simply by teaching and warning them about 
biases. But this is not to say that no debiasing strategies have 
been shown to work in this literature. A range of strategies work 
to varying degrees, depending on the bias, with the single most 
effective (and most generally effective) strategy being for the 
subject to explicitly consider and entertain a range of alternative 
perspectives or counterfactual outcomes, and what would have 
had to happen in order for those outcomes to occur (Pronin, 
Puccio and Ross 2002; Wilson et al 2002; Anderson & Sechler 
1986; Fischhoff 1982). So we do have at least one mitigation 
strategy with a significant prospect of success, taken as an 
experimental treatment.  
The problem is that the strategy is extremely difficult to 
implement as a self-deployed skill. Existing biases and 
attentional limits can easily make themselves felt as an 
unwillingness or inability to generate plausible alternative 
scenarios (O’Brien 2009, pp. 329-330); and even a willingness 
to do so is no guarantee that the generation and consideration of 
alternatives will be sufficiently disciplined or constrained to 
actually lead to a less distorted judgment (Tetlock 2005, p. 199). 
Absent the sort of facilitation or guidance by assistants that 
tends to characterize the experimental contexts in which 
“consider the opposite” is an effective strategy, there is little 
reason to expect it to be employed with regularity by individual 
agents in normal contexts, nor to work well when it is 
employed. 
Roughly and readily, then, there is a seeming dilemma 
for those who wish to teach debiasing as part of critical thinking. 
The things that are most easily teachable and open to long-term 
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retention by learners—what biases are and how they work; and 
that their distortive influences are to be avoided—are not in 
themselves very effective at debiasing people’s judgments; 
while the things that are rather effective at debiasing 
judgments—counterfactual or opposite-scenario consideration—
are not very teachable as individual skills to be recalled and 
applied when needed, nor to be implemented easily even when 
attempted. In either case, IA does not deliver. 
Again, we do not take this as grounds to doubt that there 
is still a rationale for focusing on biases in critical thinking 
education. Rather, we believe that the difficulty of teaching 
effective debiasing strategies under the assumption of IA is 
really an invitation to a broader and more fine-grained 
taxonomy of debiasing outcomes than is presupposed in IA. 
This larger terrain of debiasing outcomes should in turn create 
space for additional strategies to mitigate biases in outcomes so 
construed. If teaching debiasing looks too hard in light of the 
data just described, it is because IA focuses on doing it at the 
least plausible levels: by giving students propositional 
knowledge that will enable them to debias, or to debias their 
own thinking at the point of bias manifestation. Put differently, 
IA requires students to debias in the most cognitively 
demanding way. 
We propose to alleviate this problem by distinguishing 
further levels or domains of debiasing. These levels, we believe, 
are partly anticipated in the extant literature; various authors 
allude to some of the strategies we will explore below. But there 
exists at the moment no taxonomy of the kind we outline here, 
illuminating a wider range of overlapping skills and habits that 
can more plausibly be taught and implemented, with the aim of 
addressing biases at those different levels. We see this as 
supplementing existing strategies and, hopefully, as offering 
new ways of thinking about the challenges we outlined in this 
section. 
 
 
4. The scope of debiasing 
 
While knowing about a bias is no prophylactic in itself, it may 
serve as one of many steps along a path to debiasing (Stanovich 
& West 2008; Wilson & Brekke 1994). For example, Wilson & 
Brekke’s model lists the awareness of an unwanted process as 
the first step in debiasing. Of course, one must also be motivated 
to correct the bias, know the direction and the magnitude of this 
bias, and be sufficiently in control, with sufficient mental 
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resources, to be able to adjust the response (Wilson & Brekke 
1994, p. 119). Now, we have briefly reviewed grounds to 
believe that no individually portable suite of skills seems very 
apt to put these cognitive and affective resources to work at the 
right times. But what if we did not limit ourselves to the goal of 
preventing biased judgments, nor even that of unskewing 
judgments after they are made? 
We take the problem thus far to be an artefact of the level 
at which we have been considering both biases and debiasing 
strategies. We submit that the core issues of interest from a 
critical thinking perspective are broader—including not simply 
what one thinks, but how one acts.6 This opens up the scope of 
what will count as a debiasing strategy in the relevant sense. It 
holds out the promise that a more variegated conception of bias-
reduction will offer a range of strategies that limit bias at 
different levels and in different ways. 
In effect, we propose swapping a teaching approach that is 
simple in presentation but has little hope of success for an 
approach that will certainly be more complex in presentation, 
but has a greater chance of bearing fruit. The implausible 
approach is IA: teaching information about biases in such a way 
that learners will somehow subsequently recall that information, 
recognize its situational relevance, and act on it appropriately in 
bias-fraught contexts of thought and action. We advocate not 
only teaching information about biases, but also teaching and 
ingraining the habits, skills and dispositions that facilitate 
adopting general reasoning and decision-making principles, 
which nudge agents away from biased reasoning and filter its 
effects out of their actions. 
When we talk of a nudge, we mean the term in the sense 
advanced by Thaler & Sunstein (2009). A nudge is a strategy or 
an infrastructure put in place in order to minimize or to 
eliminate a set of cognitive biases by using aspects of the 
environment. Changing the way information is presented to 
participants or changing what the default option is are common 
examples of nudges. A striking example from Thaler & 
Sunstein’s discussion is the way food is displayed in a buffet: 
depending on where certain food items are placed, their 
“popularity” as a choice can increase by 50%. The idea here is 
to pre-emptively construct situations in order to minimize 
biases. From an individual agent’s perspective, this presents two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cf. Beaulac & Robert  (2011) on critical thinking attitudes. One strategy 
they deem particularly promising is that of epistemic caution (prudence 
épistémique). 
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dimensions of action to mitigate bias: exploiting existing nudges 
in the environment, and constructing nudges of one’s own—
either individually or collaboratively. Both the ability and the 
need to do these things generally are potential learning 
outcomes for a critical thinking course, outcomes that are 
insufficiently explored in the critical thinking literature at the 
moment. We believe our outlook gives better tools to integrate 
these ideas in the curriculum. 
While a more fine-grained analysis is surely possible, we 
will for the sake of brevity limit the current discussion to four 
broad levels at which debiasing can be implemented, once it is 
taken to span the distinction between thought and action. We 
provide both a general description and an example for each 
level. It is worthy being clear, however, that this is meant as a 
broad characterization of these levels. We recognize that the 
divisions between the levels are not razor-sharp; there may be 
borderline cases, and complex examples might bridge across 
levels. 
 
Level 1 debiasing: Owing to general education, 
environment (family, neighbourhood, education, etc.), 
habits, critical thinking education and training over a 
long period, an agent has no disposition to produce a 
particular sort of biased judgment; that is, the bias 
does not arise. This sort of debiasing process is 
implemented during education (mostly on a very long 
period) and applies to individual agents’ judgments. 
E.g., A hiring committee member does not notice or 
attend to racial differences, and shows no bias in 
reasoning about the quality of candidates from visible 
minority groups in hiring contexts because she grew 
up and still lives in a multicultural neighborhood and 
has not been markedly influenced by the media 
characterization of some groups.  
 
Level 2 debiasing: A biased judgment occurs or is 
incipient, but critical thinking education and training 
facilitate the agent’s deployment of cognitive or 
behavioral strategies that lead to a revision of the 
judgment in context. Debiasing of this kind is 
implemented within the context of judgment-fixation, 
is initiated and mediated by agents’ psychological 
processes, and applies to individual agents’ 
judgments. (E.g., models by Stanovich & West 2008, 
Wilson & Brekke 1994) 
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E.g., A hiring committee member’s first reaction is 
to assign an unwarrantedly low rating to a dossier 
from a candidate with a name connoting ethnic 
minority status. On second thought, though, she 
wonders whether she is being biased by the character 
of the name, and reflects on the positive features of 
the file. Eventually she comes to think of the 
candidate in more accurate terms. 
 
Level 3 debiasing: A biased judgment occurs or is 
incipient, but critical thinking education and training 
(individual or collective) leads (or has led) to the 
creation of situational “nudges” that debias the agent’s 
judgment in context. This sort of debiasing process is 
implemented within the context of judgment-fixation, 
is initiated or mediated by environmental cues or 
infrastructure, and applies to individual agents’ 
judgments.  
E.g., A hiring committee is given a preliminary 
presentation about the prospects for biased reasoning 
in hiring contexts. Notes and other guidelines from 
this presentation are kept in the meeting room, in a red 
folder on the table around which committee members 
sit. Later, a hiring committee member encounters a 
dossier from a candidate with a name connoting 
ethnic minority status. The visual salience of the red 
folder reminds her to attend to the significance of the 
candidate’s name. She would otherwise have assigned 
an unwarrantedly low rating to the file, but owing to 
the earlier presentation she makes a point of reflecting 
on the candidate’s positive features, considers how 
those features would appear if part of a privileged 
candidate’s application, and ranks the file more 
accurately. 
 
Level 4 debiasing: A biased judgment occurs, and is 
not significantly remedied, but situational constraints 
nevertheless debias the action or outcome. This type 
of debiasing process is implemented over time, both 
in advance of and during the context of judgment-
fixation. It is initiated or mediated by environmental 
cues or infrastructure, and applies to group judgments, 
or to actions and outcomes. 
E.g., A hiring committee member has an uncorrected 
bias of judgment against women in the profession; but 
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anonymized applications hide candidates’ gender 
information, and the committee member ultimately 
(unknowingly) votes to hire a superior woman 
candidate. 
E.g., A hiring committee member displays 
uncorrected biased reasoning in judging that a 
superior candidate should not be hired because of her 
sexual orientation; but declines to voice this view in 
light of the negative responses it would draw from 
colleagues, and ultimately votes in favor of the 
candidate. 
E.g., A hiring committee member displays 
uncorrected biased reasoning in judging that a 
superior candidate has an inferior track record, but the 
majority vote of the hiring committee favors the 
candidate, and she is offered the job anyhow. 
 
The levels represent a way of carving up the gradient from the 
most individualist and internalist character-driven approaches, 
to the most outcomes-oriented and externally-mediated 
approaches. We can characterize Levels 1 and 2 as the more 
individualistic levels; they essentially treat the particular agent 
as both the source and the focus of debiasing outcomes. Levels 3 
and 4 appeal to external, situational factors to a greater extent. 
Level 3 debiasing retains a crucial individualistic 
component, since the “nudges” or external aids to reasoning that 
it postulates are devoted to mitigating biases in the individual 
agent. The humble notion of a reminder generalizes this 
approach to contexts far beyond that of debiasing, whether in 
form of a string tied around one’s finger, or in the government-
mandated installation of seatbelt reminder lights and noises in 
motor vehicles. Just like in those more general cases, the main 
advantages of a Level 3 approach to debiasing have to do with 
reducing the cognitive load on the individual agent faced with a 
bias-detection problem. As Stanovich & West (2008) and 
Wilson & Brekke (1994) aptly observe, factors bearing on the 
detection of the bias are some of the most important reasons 
why agents end up following their biased judgments. Level 3 
debiasing strategies place this crucial detection stage outside the 
agent’s mind, making this strategy cognitively easier than Level 
2 strategies are. This makes the detection of the bias more 
likely. 
In Level 4 debiasing, this individual aspect is minimized, 
in some cases to the point of being eliminated altogether. This 
breadth of degree makes Level 4 a relatively broad and complex 
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class of debiasing approaches, ranging from those that forestall 
or minimize individual biases to those that tolerate the 
occurrence of individually manifest biased judgments, but 
minimize their significance in determining actions or outcomes. 
What distinguishes even those at the former sort end of this 
spectrum from the debiasing strategies of Level 3 is that they do 
not, at the point of decision-making, operate by debiasing the 
judgments of individual agents through the cognitive operations 
of those agents. 
In the Level 3 example provided, an object in the 
environment leads to less distorted reasoning by being noticed, 
and by focusing the agent’s attention in a potentially corrective 
way. While the first two Level 4 examples are also somewhat 
focused on individual agents, they do not involve the use of 
facilitated individual cognition and perception to promote 
debiased individual judgment. The efficacy of anonymizing 
applications in hiring, as in the first Level 4 example, is 
manifest in individual judgments, but does not require the agent 
to reflect on or notice the anonymization. Conversely, in the 
second Level 4 example, the agent who notices and reflects on 
the social costs of displaying prejudice during group decision-
making, and elects not to do so, need not be debiased in 
judgment in order for the relevant outcome to be debiased. Thus 
we propose a gradient of Level 4 strategies, some of them 
resembling Level 3 strategies in their scope and orientation, but 
with an internal unity and distinctiveness all the same. The 
external factors invoked in Level 4 strategies are essentially 
oriented towards debiasing decisions, actions, and outcomes—
including group outcomes—without specific reference to the 
dispositional properties of any particular agent. 7  Level 4 
debiasing will of course still have individualistic overtones 
dynamically, since an agent may learn what and how better to 
think about an issue by seeing a debiased outcome and process. 
Indeed, this may well be a valued feature of such debiasing 
efforts and infrastructure over the longer term. But it is not a 
defining feature of Level 4 debiasing success. 
It is worth noting that some approaches to debiasing 
already exist in the psychological literature, having some 
overlap with elements of our taxonomy. The particular 
granularity of our formulations strike us as more felicitous, 
however, and the employment of levels is a key refinement. For 
example, Croskerry et al. (2013b) place the strategy of “training 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bishop & Trout (2005) discuss the wider ramifications of such strategies for 
epistemology. 
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on theories of reasoning and medical decision making” on a par 
with creating “supportive environments” for sound reasoning 
(pp. ii67-ii68). This tends to obscure not only the significantly 
distinct causal domains associated with these strategies—the 
reasoner’s psychology versus the reasoner’s environment—but 
also the correspondingly different material, structural and 
educational preconditions they require. The latter kinds of 
difference are especially critical if one’s aim in both cases is to 
impart knowledge and training that will enable the relevant 
strategies.8 Teaching theories of reasoning is plausibly a very 
different undertaking than teaching the skills of creating and 
employing a supportive reasoning environment. Similarly, even 
though Larrick (2004) and Soll et al. (forthcoming) distinguish 
between modifying the person and modifying the environment, 
we suggest here a more fine-grained analysis that can reveal 
more alternative strategies for mitigating distorted outcomes.  
Our conjecture is that, when it comes to biases, an 
approach animated by IA treats Level 1 outcomes as the ideal 
(the bias should not come up at all), and strives at least to bring 
about Level 2 outcomes (if a bias comes about, the agent can 
correct it). We think this is practically impossible; if such 
education is ever effective, it is more likely because elements of 
the education itself are acting as persistent nudges to create 
occasional Level 3 outcomes, while the value of Level 4 
outcomes is learned by trial and error, if at all, and is 
implemented relatively haphazardly. The impetus to treat Levels 
1 and 2 as the real aim of critical thinking education depends, 
we think, not on evidence that this is a practical possibility, but 
substantially on a deep-seated intuition that critical thinking is 
properly implemented only in the minds and choices of specific 
agents. 
The three distinct examples for Level 4 debiasing reflect 
both the flexibility of the individuation of actions, and the range 
of points at which debiasing action can take place. The first 
example proposes an intervention affecting the agent’s judgment 
of candidates; with the second, the intervention debiases the 
agent’s act of voting; while the third describes a mitigation of 
nothing more specific than the committee’s collective hiring 
actions. The anonymized hiring protocol, the perception of 
social disapproval of prejudice, and the committee voting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Croskerry et al. (2013a, 2013b) may well be contemplating a clinical 
administration that teaches theories of reasoning while itself directly 
implementing supportive infrastructure such as decision check-lists; we are 
contemplating how to bring about both kinds of outcome through education. 
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structure each count as an element of contextual engineering that 
effectively debiases the Level 4 scenario, even though all Level 
4 cases by definition count as failures of debiasing by the purely 
individualistic cognitive standards we originally considered.  
Clearly, then, this more fine-grained analysis reveals 
more opportunities to debias by clarifying the number of stages 
open to intervention in thinking, preparing, deciding and acting. 
Variations on the theme are not hard to find, moreover, 
including some that span the levels we have sketched. For 
example, Uhlmann and Cohen (2005) found that, if the notion of 
merit were left undefined for a hiring process, it would tend to 
become the vehicle of gender-biased decision making. That is, 
merit would be operationalized distinctly from case to case, with 
the overall effect of promoting hiring along gender lines—and 
particularly the hiring of men over women.9 But eliciting a 
commitment to some hallmarks of merit from the evaluators 
prior to revealing information about the people being evaluated 
reduced this biased “moving goalposts” approach in their 
judgments (2005, p. 478). The example provides further 
empirical support for the idea that education about the advance 
construction and acceptance of such policies and organizational 
structures should fall within the core mandate of education for 
reaching more appropriately reflective and reliable outcomes in 
reasoning.  
Arguably this counts as a remedy that straddles the 
border between Levels 3 and 4, since the incipient bias is 
corrected in judgment, not merely in action or outcome; yet in 
practice the mechanisms achieving this outcome will be 
thoroughly environmental and causally remote. That is, 
somebody has to decide (presumably well in advance, in the 
case of policy-making) to set out clear rubrics for merit, and to 
ensure a hiring process structured so that evaluators review the 
hallmarks of merit before they review the details of applicants. 
So not every case of debiasing falls entirely within one such 
level; but we do think that this particular way of carving up of 
levels helps illuminate relevant features of even those cases 
spanning levels.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 There was also weak evidence that female evaluators would 
similarly construct merit in a gender-biased way to devalue male 
applicants, if the job were sufficiently stereotypically associated with 
women’s gender roles—e.g., that of a Women’s Studies professor 
(2005, p. 478). 
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5. Teaching debiasing as teaching acceptance of influences 
on cognition and constraints on action 
 
There is, then, a very broad recipe for achieving better odds of 
teaching successful debiasing strategies: first broaden the 
conception of what counts as debiasing, and then be open to 
exploiting the full spectrum of opportunities to mitigate bias, 
from antecedent reasoning dispositions to the broadest 
conception of an action in context. We close with some 
schematic remarks about putting debiasing, so construed, into a 
typical critical thinking curriculum.  
The approach we suggest becomes more plausibly 
effective than the debiasing strategies described earlier when it 
motivates us to subject ourselves to nudges, infrastructure and 
institutions in advance of the circumstances of bias that will 
make those things effective debiasing aids. That is, we hold that 
knowledge of biases has the best chance of effectiveness when it 
leads one generally to accept and construct nudges or contextual 
engineering of one’s own. In that case it supports the adoption 
of general debiasing strategies that might simply be encoded in 
the lived environment, rather than holding out the hope that one 
can learn to debias in a series of contextual one-offs, as the need 
arises. 
Of course, it is also important to note that, at this time, 
there are few direct empirical grounds for confidence that 
teaching skills and attitudes specifically to promote Level 3 and 
Level 4 debiasing in critical thinking courses will be easy or 
highly effective. We do not claim to show this; only that it is 
worth trying. Perhaps the most certain line of reasoning at our 
disposal is probabilistic. Unless the probability of success under 
our broader construal of debiasing outcomes is literally zero, the 
addition of this slate of options can only improve the chances of 
overall success in teaching debiasing skills. How close to zero 
that probability could be while yet justifying the effort of the 
attempt is a good question that we will not attempt to answer 
beyond offering three observations: first, that testing such 
payoffs is what pilot projects and exploratory studies are for; 
second, that critical thinking education incorporating IA already 
consumes many resources when its low chances of debiasing 
success are known; and third, that the chances of success, on 
our account, are unlikely to be that low. After all, the creation of 
and deference to bias-reducing infrastructure is palpably 
something that can spread through professional mentorship and 
collegial training. For example, instructors demonstrably can 
acquire from their peers various debiasing practices such as 
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anonymizing student work. When these outcomes are the 
explicit objects of training, they seem teachable and learnable; 
we think this shows that one would need a special reason for 
thinking that they are not largely or significantly teachable in 
courses that explicitly aim to teach them, rather than a special 
reason to think that they are. So we do not claim that our 
approach is sure bet to succeed, but we do claim that it is a 
reasonable bet, and in any case a better bet than what IA 
represents. 
On our view, an education in debiasing includes an 
education in how to administer decision-making contexts and 
actions in a manner consonant with Level 3 and Level 4 
debiasing. Analogies and antecedents might be found with a 
range of cases of training in controlling one’s environment and 
actions, rather than merely one’s internal states. For example, 
clinical psychologists and psychotherapists refer to the strategy 
of controlling one’s environment in order to regulate thoughts 
and behaviour as stimulus control. When manifest as a kind of 
self-regulation it is a familiar and central element of many forms 
of (teachable, learnable) therapies, including Cognitive-
Behavioural Therapy (Karoly 2012, p. 201). Roughly speaking, 
rather than trying merely to teach patients suffering from 
alcoholism or gambling addictions how to avoid drinking while 
at a bar, or how to avoid gambling while at the casino, 
mitigation strategies include also teaching the ability to avoid 
the bar and the casino in the first place. Choices that determine 
one’s environmental stimuli have profound influences on the 
sort of thoughts and actions that follow. 
Similarly, choices ranging from how to form 
committees, how to solicit information, which buttons to push 
on the television remote control, and whether to ask about 
someone’s personal details during a job interview can all 
powerfully influence the opportunities for biases to be reflected 
in our actions. It follows that the knowledge (both knowledge-
that and knowledge-how) associated with those activities are 
reasonable components of an education in critical thinking. This 
knowledge will include skills of creating and maintaining 
physical, institutional and social infrastructure that facilitates 
more truth-conducive reasoning. But often this infrastructure 
already exists when students and former students encounter 
contexts of judgment and action; in those cases, the relevant 
skill will be that of deferring to such truth-conducive 
mechanisms. How to teach this knowledge and these action 
principles is a good question. Its feasibility, though, seems far 
more promising than the mere hope of IA, that some 
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combination of knowledge of biases and mental continence will 
be both effective and learnable. 
It is worth considering a potential objection to the Level 
4 style of debiasing education proposed here, proceeding from 
an amalgam of epistemological and pedagogical scruples. The 
worry is this: whatever the didactic barriers to focusing on 
Levels 1, 2 and 3 as debiasing strategies, addressing one’s 
teaching to these levels at least promotes the right connection 
between methods and outcomes. By teaching students to 
recognize bias-inducing situations and to mobilize appropriate 
debiasing strategies in context as individuals, one would be 
teaching students to make cogent inferences regarding the need 
for unbiased or less-biased reasoning. Level 4’s blunt focus on 
debiased outcomes does not require anyone in the context to 
appreciate the problem, nor why it is a problem, nor how the 
debiasing mechanisms will address the problem. For all that a 
Level 4 approach tells us, successful debiasing processes can be 
entirely arational from the perspective of the agents in the 
situation.  
Thinking back to our examples of Level 4 debiasing, 
therefore, one might ask: How can these be critical thinking 
strategies, strictly speaking, when they encompass solutions that 
do not involve thinking about the problem at all? On this 
objection, such an approach to debiasing in critical thinking 
education misses something valuable about students’ 
understanding of the rational connections between reasons and 
outcomes – something that students in a critical reasoning 
course should be taught to entertain, not to elide.  
The worry is based on an overly narrow conception both 
of the scope of the problem and of the problem-solving context. 
Here it may be useful to return to the analogy with addiction 
patients who avoid pathological activities by avoiding situations 
that lead to those activities. The gambling addict need not avoid 
gambling situations solely by reflecting on the evils of 
gambling, nor need she choose to do some other activity on the 
basis of such reflections at the time of the engaging in the 
alternative activity. She might engage in a non-gambling 
activity out of sheer habit; but if she originally cultivated that 
habit as a means of avoiding gambling, then any particular case 
of avoidance by way of that activity reflects her considered 
judgment and her autonomy. 
The proposal at hand puts forward a similar (minimally 
sufficient) connection between education about biases and 
students’ subsequent participation, possibly just from habit, in 
cognitive and social routines and practices that promote reliable 
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reasoning. A rational and appropriately agent-endorsed 
connection between outcomes and methods is established when 
students are educated about the need to form such habits, or to 
defer to truth-conducive judgment and action mechanisms. 
Subsequently acting on those habits need not itself be an 
exercise in reasoning or inference at the point of action in order 
to be an exercise of the agent’s commitment to critically 
informed reasoning. Indeed, consciously reviewing one’s 
reasons at the point of decision-making might even disrupt the 
debiasing process. To deny that this represents the exercise of 
critical reasoning is to deny, by parity of reasoning, that the 
lifelong alcoholic who cultivates a preference for badminton as 
an alternative to hanging out in a pub is not demonstrating a 
willful continence regarding alcohol when she remains sober for 
years on end by spending time at the gym.  
Examples of a similar shape are already implemented in 
some institutions, with the case of anonymized musical auditions 
being particularly telling. Women have long been 
underrepresented in orchestras around the world, comprising 
fewer than 10% of musicians in major American orchestras 
prior to the 1970s and little more than 20% in the 1980s, a much 
lower proportion than their availability in the hiring “pipeline” 
(Goldin & Rouse 2000). Of the various practices introduced by 
orchestras to reduce biases that might account for this 
imbalance, the most common means is to ensure the anonymity 
of candidates during auditions, by placing the musician behind a 
screen where he or she plays for 5 to 10 minutes (Goldin & 
Rouse 2000, p. 722). The screen is not used uniformly across 
orchestras; only three of the 11 orchestras discussed in by 
Goldin and Rouse use it all the way through the process (2000, 
p. 723). The effects of the screen, however, are remarkable: 
when the screen was used throughout the process, the 
probability that a woman would be offered the job was 60% 
higher than without it. 
The use of the screen is clearly a Level 4 debiasing 
strategy in our taxonomy: its success in debiasing the outcome 
of the decision process does not require reduction of the 
dispositional or occurrent biases of the individual deciders at the 
point of evaluating candidates. Yet the prior decision to 
implement a general policy of anonymized auditioning is 
plausibly driven by just the sort of empirical details about 
biases, and commitments to erring on the side of caution, that a 
sound critical thinking education may inculcate. This sort of 
decision, made well in advance on the basis of general 
principles, is not hostage to the need for agents to recognize in 
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the context of judgment that they are biased. Nevertheless, it is a 
touchstone case of a critical thinking strategy that depends 
crucially on agents’ thinking about the problem. It just enables 
them to think at arm’s length from the situations in which the 
bias itself will disrupt their capacities to mitigate it. Teaching 
within critical thinking courses how effective such approaches 
are will hopefully increase the proportion of students trying to 
solve problems by implementing such Level 3 and 4 strategies 
within their own (current or future) workplace. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
There is a familiar learning model associated with propositional 
knowledge of the “Paris is the capital city of France” sort. There 
is also a familiar set of habits of learning and application that 
enables students (and former students) to apply that knowledge 
over the longer term of their lives. The problem with IA is that 
this sort of knowledge—that biases operate in particular ways, 
that they occur in situations like the one at hand, and that one is 
susceptible to them in contexts like this—does not reliably issue 
in debiasing behaviours at the point of decision or judgment. A 
wider view of what counts as successful debiasing indicates a 
richer class of ways to apply teachable knowledge to the project 
of debiasing. 
Our view, then, is that critical thinking education should 
include extensive practical guidance on how to structure and 
engage with one’s environment to promote good reasoning. This 
will include teaching how and why to adopt decision-making 
policies and evidence-gathering practices that do not require the 
virtuoso ability to rise above invisible and subtle biases. And it 
will offer learners the opportunity to practice and experiment 
with infrastructure creation and reasonable epistemic deference. 
The intended learning outcomes on our model do include 
individual learners’ coming explicitly to reason more truth-
conducively in specific cases. But they also include, and place 
great emphasis upon, outcomes that are implicit and habitual 
from the individual’s perspective, and which have their main 
intended effect over the long term and at group levels. 
What kind of information, advice, guidance and practice 
will critical thinking courses of this sort offer? How are these 
things best taught? These, we think, are among the next big 
questions in critical thinking education. 
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